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Foreword | In the increasingly dynamic 
environment of mobile forensics, this 
paper provides an overview of the 
capabilities of three popular mobile 
forensic tools on three mobile phones 
based on Apple’s iOS, Google’s Android 
and RIM’s BlackBerry operating systems. 
The paper identifies where each specific 
tool is best applied and also describes 
the limitations of each in accessing 
contacts, call history, message data 
(SMS, MMS and emails), media files  
and other data. New releases of forensic 
tools and mobile operating systems may 
change the way the data are acquired 
and preserved in the future. It is 
therefore hoped that future research will 
continue to provide the digital forensics 
community with the most up-to-date 
overview of mobile forensics capabilities.
Adam Tomison 
Director
Mobile devices are fast becoming ubiquitous in populations worldwide. For example, the 
2012 IBM Tech Trends Report (based on a survey of more than 1,200 professionals who 
make technology decisions for their organisations in 16 different industries and 13  
countries, as well as more than 250 academics and 450 students across these same 
countries) predicted that
[b]y the end of 2012, mobile devices are expected to outnumber people. Sources of 
analytical insight continue to multiply, with the world generating 15 petabytes of new 
data every day—that’s roughly eight times the information housed in all the academic 
libraries in the United States (Lo, Wyble & Hupfer 2012: 2).
The Australian Communications and Media Authority also demonstrated the growth  
and ubiquity of Australian mobile devices in their recent report Communications Report 
2011–12, which noted
[t]he total number of mobile services in operation increased by three per cent to  
reach 30.2 million, approximately four mobile services to every three people in 
Australia (ACMA 2013a: 3).
With the increasing prevalence of mobile devices, forensic evidence extracted from 
mobile (as well as other electronic) devices can be an invaluable source of evidence for 
investigators in both civil and criminal prosecution (Adams, Whitledge & Shenoi 2008). 
Mobile device data can be extracted and then used to generate reports on a range of 
data including an individual’s communication and travel habits. For example, in a criminal 
investigation, the data including transaction information such as call history, message  
data (SMS/MMS/emails), calendar events, photos and emails, are often able to be  
supplied to the investigating officer in a report format (Androulidakis 2012). For the  
evidence to be admissible in a court of law, appropriate forensic procedures must be 
followed (McKemmish 2008).
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While these forensic procedures are 
often organisation specific, a number of 
frameworks exist to provide guidance for 
the conduct of digital forensics that form 
that basis of these procedures. These 
frameworks have been published (Kent et 
al. 2006; McKemmish 1999; Martini & Choo 
2012), as have mobile forensic procedures 
and tools (Me & Rossi 2008; Owen & 
Thomas 2011; Savoldi & Gubian 2008).  
This has allowed practitioners to make 
sound decisions in the development of  
high-level forensic procedures and in 
specific cases using specific tools (Guo, 
Slay & Beckett 2009).
One of the key strategic challenges 
presented to digital forensic practitioners, 
particularly those in law enforcement, is 
maintaining capability in an environment 
of rapid development of information and 
communications technologies, and its ready 
adoption by the public and offenders (Adams 
2008; Choo 2011). Smart mobile devices, 
for example, are much more complex than 
traditional mobile phones and with a range of 
personal data management facilities, these 
mobile devices more resemble personal 
computers than they do phones (Lim & 
Khoo 2009; Quick & Choo forthcoming). 
This makes them particularly interesting 
candidates for analysis as they hold a 
significant amount of data that could be of 
interest to a forensic investigator. However, 
the method of collecting evidence is quite 
different when compared with traditional 
forensic computer hard disk (Jansen,  
Delaitre & Moenner 2008).
While there is a large range of smart mobile 
devices, three main operating systems 
dominate the market, namely Apple iOS, 
Google Android and RIM Blackberry (see 
Table 1; ACMA 2013). These are the three 
operating systems that the analysis focuses 
on in this paper. To analyse the capabilities 
available to forensic practitioners in the 
area of mobile forensics, three of the most 
popular mobile forensic collection and 
analysis tools were used. The three tools 
selected were Tool 1, Tool 2 and Tool 3 
(these software tools have been anonymised 
to avoid being seen as promoting 
commercial interests, however information 
can be provided upon request). These 
tools are currently popular with forensic 
practitioners both locally and globally, and 
as such, this typifies the range of capabilities 
available to forensic practitioners in the area 
of mobile forensics. This paper describes 
the role of mobile forensic collection and 
analysis tools. The term extraction is used 
to refer to the process of collecting and 
extracting of data from mobile devices  
using the mobile forensic tools.
Study setup
Smart mobile devices
The following three phones were selected 
for this study, based upon the popularity of 
their operating systems—Apple iPhone 4 
16GB, HTC Sensation XE with beats Audio 
Z715a and BlackBerry Bold 9700 (see Table 
2). Although these phones were not running 
the very latest versions of their operating 
systems at the time of the study, this was 
intentional. Digital forensic tools can take 
some time to be certified as capable of 
analysing newer versions of operating 
systems and therefore, it was considered 
prudent to use supported operating 
systems with the mobile forensics tools 
wherever possible.
To ensure that the study results were valid 
and as close as possible to real world 
practice, the three phones selected were 
used extensively by real users before being 
used in this study. This proved invaluable 
compared with only seeding the phones 
with a minimum of data as it allowed 
detection of anomalies within high volumes 
and a range of data that would otherwise 
not have been detected (this is discussed 
further in the Findings and Implications for 
Digital Forensic Practitioners section).
Personal computer environment
All of the forensic tools used required 
a computer for analysis or viewing of 
reports. To ensure that there were no 
conflicts between the tools, all three tools 
were installed on three separate personal 
Table 1 Top six smartphone operating systems (%)a
Mobile device  
operating system
Q2 2012 US 
market share
Q2 2012 AUS 
market share
Q2 2012 EU  
market share Q2 2012 average
Android 41.9 58.0 61.0 53.4
iOS 53.3 35.9 25.3 38.2
Blackberry OS 1.4 0.3 4.4 2.0
Symbian 0.2 1.0 2.6 1.3
Windows Phone 7 2.7 4.2 4.7 3.9
Other 0.6 0.7 2.0 1.1
a: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: Adapted from ACMA 2013b
Table 2 Specifications of mobile devices
Mobile device
iPhone 4 16GB  
Black GSM (A1332)
HTC Sensation XE  
Beats Audio Z715a BlackBerry Bold 9700
Manufacturer Apple HTC RIM
Operating system 5.1 Android 4.0.3 
(Ice Cream Sandwich)
Blackberry OS v5.0
RAM 16GB 4GB 
(1GB user available)
256MB
Internal memory 512 MB 768MB 256MB
External memory card none microSD (8GB) microSD (2GB)
Chipset Apple A4 Qualcomm MSM8260 
Snapdragon
Marvell PXA930
CPU 1 GHz Cortex-A8 Dual-core 1.5 GHz 
Scorpion
624 MHz
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computers of identical specifications. As 
one of the tools only supported a 32bit 
operating system, to maintain an identical 
environment all the tools were restricted 
to a 32bit operating system with 3.16GB 
of usable random-access memory (RAM). 
RAM is a form of temporary computer data 
storage. The specifications of the PCs used 
in this study are as follows:
CPU: Intel® Core™ i5-2410M 2.3GHz
RAM: 4GB (3.16GB usable)
OS: Windows 7 Professional SP1 32bit
GPU: NVIDIA GeForce GT 540M 1GB
HDD: 750GB @ 5400rpm
Mobile forensics tools
Three popular mobile device forensic tools 
were used in this study.
Tool 1 and Tool 2 both have supported 
phone guides that list the phones that have 
been certified by the vendor as working with 
their product and the capabilities for forensic 
extraction their product supports for a given 
phone. Tool 3 lists the operating systems 
that are supported for extraction.
Both logical and physical extractions using 
all three tools were attempted. Logical 
extraction refers to the ability to copy the 
logical storage objects of the mobile device 
(eg directories and files; Grispos, Storer & 
Glisson 2011). All of the tools selected have 
the ability to perform a logical extraction; it 
is understood that this extraction acquires 
the data from the mobile device using the 
vendor’s interface, which is most commonly 
used for synchronising the handset with a 
computer. This extraction method does not 
usually recover any deleted information due 
to the data being transferred file by  
file rather than bit for bit.
Physical extraction refers to the ability 
to perform a bit-for-bit copy of the entire 
physical storage, which allows the forensic 
tools to acquire remnants of deleted data 
(Grispos, Storer & Glisson 2011). However, 
this process requires direct access to the 
file system of the mobile device. This is 
necessary to be able to recover deleted 
data from the disk using methods such  
as carving, where particular file headers  
are searched for to recover target file  
types. Carving is a commonly used 
technique in digital forensics to extract  
a collection of data from a larger data  
set (see DFRWS 2006).
Study results format
Prior to undertaking the study, it is 
necessary to define the types of data  
that needed to be collected from physical 
and logical extractions. Each of the output 
data types available from the forensic tools 
was reviewed and it was found that while 
they shared a subset of common data 
types (eg contact data, call history, SMS, 
MMS, images, audio, video), they also 
had a number of less common data types 
that were not supported across all three 
tools. The study results focus on the data 
types that were best represented across 
all three of the forensic tools. As such, only 
the results on the following data types—
contacts, call history, SMS, MMS, email, 
calendar entries, bookmarks, web history, 
images, video and audio—are reported. 
These data types were extracted and the 
total number of items tallied (both current 
and deleted). Where a difference was 
noted, further investigation was conducted 
to determine what data was different and 
if possible, why the difference occurred 
between the forensic tools.
Findings and implications for 
digital forensic practitioners
Tables 3 to 8 show the number of items 
extracted by the forensic tools across the 
three mobile devices (inclusive of deleted 
items). The figures in bold parentheses 
represent the number of deleted items.
Table 3 iPhone logical extraction results
Data type Tool 1 Tool 2 Tool 3
Contacts 0a 0a 0a
Call history 100 100 100
SMS 41,181 (1,485) 29,798 41,181
MMS 205 202 202
Email Unsupportedb Unsupported Unsupported
Calendar entries 1 Unsupported 1
Bookmarks 22 Unsupported 22
Web history 15 Unsupported 15
Images 870 418 1,412
Video 23 23 23
Audio 0c 0c 0c
a: The device did not have any undeleted contact data at the time of extraction
b: Tool 1 documentation notes that iPhones must be jailbroken (a process that bypasses software protections to allow privileged code to 
execute on the mobile device without manufacturer approval) to extract emails in logical mode. Other tools may have similar limitations
c: The device did not have any undeleted audio files stored at the time of extraction
Table 4 Android logical extraction results
Data type Tool 1 Tool 2 Tool 3
Contacts 156 399 430
Call history 323 323 323
SMS 3,027 3,027 3,027
MMS 46 46 46
Email Unsupported Unsupported Unsupported
Calendar entries 89 89 89
Bookmarks 12 Unsupported 12
Web history 245 Unsupported 245
Images 2,691 2,170 78
Video 11 8 0
Audio 200 31 0
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Contacts
The contact data extracted from the 
Android device demonstrated the 
complexities in collecting contact data 
stored on a device that correlates data  
from multiple sources (see Tables 4 and 
7). The iPhone did not have contact data 
stored and as such, could not be assessed 
under this category. The Blackberry 
results were very similar across all three 
forensic tools; Tool 3 produced a number 
of duplicate entries, however, once these 
duplicate entries were removed, Tool 3 
extracted a similar sum to the other two 
tools (see Table 5).
The large variances in the Android results 
appear to relate to the multiple data sources 
for contacts on the device. Contact data 
sources on the device included local 
records, Google accounts, a Facebook 
account and a LinkedIn account. The 
forensic tools handled these different data 
sources in different ways—some accounts 
were merged by some tools, other accounts 
could not be extracted at all by some tools. 
Tool 3 was the most comprehensive of the 
tools in collecting contact data, however, 
it is difficult to determine exactly which 
contacts were extracted from which  
source using the tools.
Call history
All three forensic tools successfully 
extracted call history records across the 
three mobile devices as part of the logical 
extraction process (see Tables 3–5). The 
data extracted was similar in all cases but 
Tool 1 found six deleted call history records. 
This was unable to be proven as the call 
history was not pre-populated onto the 
mobile device. Physical extraction produced 
similar results for those tools that supported 
the mobile devices (see Tables 6–8).
SMS/MMS
SMS and MMS messaging demonstrated 
the utility of using devices with ‘real world’ 
usage. While the Android and Blackberry 
SMS/MMS messaging data was logically 
extracted successfully, the iPhone showed  
a number of anomalies. This was likely due 
to the large volume and types of messages 
on the device. All three tools extracted 
significantly different numbers of SMS 
messages from the iPhone and as such,  
the remainder of this section describes the 
iPhone results.
Tool 1 was unexpectedly able to recover 
approximately 1,485 deleted messages 
from the iPhone during the logical 
extraction. It is considered that it was able 
to recover the messages from the SQLITE 
database (which stores the messages), as 
the sms.db file keeps deleted records until  
a garbage collection operation is run. 
Garbage collection is a clean-up operation, 
which is normally run on demand or when  
a database is idle for performance reasons.
Tool 2 was only able to extract a maximum 
of 30,000 SMS messages (after several 
attempts) before reporting a memory 
limitation issue for the Tool (see Figure 1). 
This study also appeared to demonstrate 
that a maximum of 30,000 non-file records 
(eg contacts, call log, SMS etc) can be 
extracted by Tool 2 from an iPhone in logical 
mode.
Once deleted messages had been removed, 
Tool 1 and Tool 3 differed by only one SMS 
message. Further investigation determined 
that this was due to data inconsistency 
(an invalid SMS) and this invalid SMS was 
removed from the Tool 1 total, therefore 
Table 5 Blackberry logical extraction results
Data type Tool 1 Tool 2 Tool 3
Contacts 76 75 75a
Call history 53 53 53
SMS 245 245 245
MMS 4 4 4
Email 117 Unsupported 117
Calendar entries 19 11 11
Bookmarks 2 Unsupported 2
Web history 1 Unsupported 1b
Images 46 46 46
Video 3 3 3
Audio 22 22 22
a: Tool 3 reported 89 contact entries, however 14 were found to be duplicates
b: Tool 3 extracted 6 additional cache entries not included in this total
Table 6 iPhone physical extraction results
Data type Tool 1 Tool 2 Tool 3
Contacts 0a 0a
Call history 100 (6) 101 (1)
SMS 41,182 (1,496) 41,388 (228)
MMS 205 202
Email 50 50 (38)
Calendar entries 1 1 Unsupported
Bookmarks 22 22
Web history 40 15
Images 883 961 (4)
Video 23 23
Audio 0b 0b
a: The device did not have any undeleted contact data at the time of extraction
b: The device did not have any undeleted audio files stored at the time of extraction
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making the total number of undeleted SMS 
extracted by Tool 1 and Tool 3 equal. Tool 
1 was able to extract three more MMS 
messages than Tool 2 and Tool 3, this 
appears to relate to how the forensic tools 
handle messages that are blank or contain 
unprintable characters.
Email
Email was generally not well supported by 
the forensic tools on any of the devices 
tested. For the logical extraction, emails 
from the Blackberry were only successfully 
extracted using Tool 1 and Tool 3. All other 
logical combinations could not proceed. 
This was often due to the need to jailbreak 
or root the device. A jailbreak (a process 
that bypasses software protections to allow 
privileged code to execute on the mobile 
device without manufacturer approval; 
Obaidli, Iqbal & Iqbal 2012) was not used 
and neither was a root (a process that 
permits loaded software to bypass standard 
software restrictions and gain ‘root’ super-
user privileges; Christin, Vidas & Zhang 
2011) on any devices as part of this study. 
In the case of the Android device, the only 
viable method of rooting required unlocking 
the boot loader, which (using the vendor’s 
application) would securely erase the 
phone’s contents.
Physical extractions fared slightly better. 
Tool 2 was able to collect more emails from 
the Blackberry device in physical extraction 
mode than the other two tools were able 
to in logical mode (as well as some deleted 
emails). iPhone email was also extracted  
as part of the physical extraction and both  
Tool 2 and Tool 1 were able to extract 50 
emails, with Tool 2 able to locate 38 deleted 
emails on the iPhone device.
Calendar entries
Calendar entries were extracted and 
reported on by the tools that supported 
calendar data. Support did vary somewhat 
between the tools. For example, with the 
Blackberry logical extraction, Facebook 
calendar data (birthdays) (included under 
‘Calendar entries’—see Table 5) were 
extracted by Tool 1 but not by the other 
two tools. This implies that all Facebook 
calendar entries would not have been 
included in the extraction reports of the 
other tools. Tool 2 was able to recover five 
deleted calendar entries from the Blackberry 
as part of its physical extraction.
Bookmarks
Bookmark collection was mostly identical 
across the tools that supported their 
extraction from a mobile device. Both 
physical and logical extractions produced 
the same number of bookmark entries for 
each tool, per device.
Web history
Web history collection produced similar 
results across logical extractions from 
tools that supported history extraction. 
The format in which this data is displayed 
varied between the tools, as did what each 
tool considered a web history record. Tool 
1, for example, was able to include history 
records from the YouTube application on 
the iPhone device as part of web history, 
which the other two tools did not. Equally, 
Tool 3 presented ‘cache’ information (which 
is considered part of web history) and the 
other two tools did not.
Physical extraction presented quite different 
results from the logical extraction, with many 
more entries found by supported tools. It  
is presumed that the methods used by the 
tools for collecting web history vary 
significantly between logical and physical 
extractions. This is by contrast with other 
item collections where the similarities in 
numbers of items extracted would suggest 
that the same or very similar methods are 
being used to collect data from physical  
and logical extractions (eg parsing a 
database file).
Media files
Media files including images, videos and 
audio were extracted in similar numbers 
across those tools that supported these 
items. Where logical tools required physical 
Table 7 Android physical extraction results
Data type Tool 1 Tool 2 Tool 3
Contacts 133 (26)
Call history 0
SMS 3,207 (181)
MMS 45 (1)
Email 31 (3)
Calendar entries Unsupported 89 Unsupported
Bookmarks 12
Web history 263 (15)
Images 10,985 (1,502)
Video 18 (22)
Audio 76
Table 8 Blackberry physical extraction results
Data type Tool 1 Tool 2 Tool 3
Contacts
Unsupported
113 (38)
Call history 52
SMS 269 (24)
MMS 0
Email 124 (4)
Calendar entries 27 (5) Unsupported
Bookmarks 0
Web history 92
Images 58 136
Video 5 4
Audio 27 0
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access to the SD memory card (ie removal 
from the device and insertion into a card 
reader) from the device to collect media 
items, the study did not proceed as it 
was considered to be part of a physical 
extraction.
One interesting difference was the 
increased number of image and video  
files detected by Tool 1 as part of the 
logical Android extraction. Tool 1 was  
able to detect the extra files as it appeared 
to use file signature analysis to detect 
these file types rather than simply relying 
on file extensions. Most of the media files 
located via this process were standard 
files (eg mp3 and mp4) used in installed 
applications with modified extensions.
Physical extraction
Support for extraction did not appear to 
be strong across all three devices and 
three tools tested. A number of device/tool 
combinations were unsupported for physical 
extraction and even when supported, the 
results were mixed. The physical extraction 
methods had to be repeated several 
times before a successful result could be 
declared. Physical extraction is an area for 
potential improvement with all of the forensic 
tools used in this study.
Conclusion
The aim of this study was to gain a better 
understanding of the practical capabilities 
of three popular mobile forensics tools 
in collecting and analysing three popular 
mobile devices. These mobile devices 
represent the three most popular operating 
systems (iOS, Android and Blackberry) for 
smart mobile devices worldwide. Findings 
were mixed and it was concluded that no 
single tool can be solely relied upon to 
collect and present every item of potential 
evidence from a smart mobile device.
During this study, both innovative features 
and limitations were found. Some of the 
more innovative features some tools 
presented included recovering deleted 
messages from a logical extraction, file 
signature analysis on mobile devices to 
detect files with non-standard extensions, 
extraction of data (eg contacts, calendar) 
from multiple original sources and 
comprehensive collection of web records 
beyond the default browser. Limitations 
found included the requirement to ‘root’  
a phone, which would result in the 
destruction of the data stored on the  
device, hard limits for the collection of text 
data from a mobile device and incoherent 
display of data making comparison of data 
such as contacts and messaging difficult,  
if not impossible. These limitations are not 
insurmountable as it is assumed that given 
time, many of them will be overcome as  
the mobile forensics tools are updated  
and upgraded. Due to the sheer number  
of different handsets entering the world 
market, it is very unlikely that every tool  
will have the ability to support all phones as 
demonstrated in this study.
It should be noted that results may vary 
when analysing mobile devices that use 
operating systems designed for use by 
many different manufacturers (eg Android). 
Manufacturers will often customise their 
implementation of the operating system, 
which can result in data being stored in 
different locations to the standard operating 
system conventions (eg HTC Sense and 
Samsung TouchWiz).
To successfully collect the maximum 
amount of data from a mobile device, 
investigators and practitioners need to be 
aware of the key features and limitations of 
the tools they use. This will allow them to 
make informed selections in an environment 
where timeliness is often critical and 
workloads are high. However, forensic tools 
are constantly updated to provide support 
for new devices and expand support for 
existing devices.
Disclaimer
At the time of this research, findings 
are accurate to the best of the authors’ 
knowledge. However, new releases of 
forensic tools and mobile operating systems 
may change the way the data are acquired 
and preserved in the future.
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